Republic of the Philippines VS VILLASOR (G.R. No. L-30671) Constitutional Law

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J. KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.

Ponente: FERNANDO, J.:

Action:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition

Facts:

A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings in favor of respondents P. J. Kiener Co., Ltd, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. The respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the said decision final and executory, directing the Sheriffs to execute the said decision. The corresponding Alia Writ of Execution was issued. On the strength of the aforementioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served Notices of Garnishment. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the AFP.

Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment are null and void.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.

2. Whether or not the notice of garnishment issued by Judge Villasor is valid.

Ruling: The writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted

Ratio Decidendi:

It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may cause private parties, the loss of government efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater is such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted.

What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. From a logical and sound sense from the basic concept of the non-suability of the State, public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.